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THE DECLINE OF TITLE II COMMON-
CARRIER REGULATIONS IN THE WAKE OF
BRAND X LONG-RUN SUCCESS FOR
CONSUMERS, COMPETITION, AND THE
BROADBAND INTERNET MARKET
Justin P. Hedge
"[L]et there be no doubt: competition among broadband providers is flour-
ishing.... I am confident that today's Order does much to fulfill our promise
to the American people .. .
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") has
recently undertaken efforts to uniformly articulate the proper regulatory treat-
ment of broadband Internet services.' The Commission's action directly re-
I In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities; Universal Service Obligations of Broadband Providers; Review of Regulatory
Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecommunications Services; Computer [II
Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company Provision of Enhanced Services;
1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of Computer III and ONA Safeguards and Re-
quirements; Conditional Petition of the Verizon Telephone Companies for Forbearance
Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) with Regard to Broadband Services Provided Via Fiber to the
Premises; Petition of the Verizon Telephone Companies for Declaratory Ruling or, Alterna-
tively, for Interim Waiver with Regard to Broadband Services Provided Via Fiber to the
Premises; Consumer Protection in the Broadband Era, Report and Order and Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853, at 15,108 (Aug. 5, 2005) (Abernathy, Comm'r,
concurring) [hereinafter DSL Ruling].
2 See generally In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Ca-
ble and Other Facilities; Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling; Appropriate Regulatory
Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities, Declaratory Ruling
and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (Mar. 14, 2002) [hereinafter Cable
Ruling] (holding that cable companies are not subject to common-carrier, a significant deci-
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duced the applicability of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act")
Title II common-carrier requirements to broadband Internet providers-an ac-
tion with far-reaching implications for the telecommunications market.' In June
2005, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the FCC's ability to effect this change
via statutory interpretation in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass' v.
Brand X Internet Services.4 The Supreme Court's approval solidified broad
FCC authority to create a new regulatory framework for broadband Internet
services under the purview of existing telecommunications law.5 The Commis-
sion continues to exercise its authority since the Brand X decision, taking addi-
tional steps to reshape the broadband regulatory framework.6 However,
throughout its actions, the FCC remains faithful to the original congressional
intent of the 1996 Act: to foster a more competitive telecommunications mar-
ket that encourages the deployment of advanced telecommunications capability
with minimal governmental interference.7
By taking steps to bring cable, DSL, and other wireline Internet providers
outside of the common-carrier requirements, the FCC executed a policy shift
that decisively reflects the competitive and deregulatory intent of Congress
This deregulation will benefit customers by promoting development of broad-
band technology and competition, which in turn will result in a decrease in
prices and create more service options for consumers.9 In light of this antici-
pated result, consumers will benefit over the long-run from the FCC's Title II
deregulation.
sion that is discussed in detail in subsequent sections).
3 Id. 11134-40.
4 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005).
5 See id. at 2708.
6 See generally DSL Ruling, supra note I (extending the changes promulgated in the
Cable Ruling which will be discussed in detail in subsequent sections).
7 See, e.g., Cable Ruling, supra note 2, 1 4-7; DSL Ruling, supra note 1, 77-80; In
re Wireless Operations in the 3650-3700 MHz Band; Rules for Wireless Broadband Ser-
vices in the 3650-3700 MHz Band; Additional Spectrum for Unlicensed Devices Below 900
MHz and in the 3 GHz Band; Amendment of the Commission's Rules With Regard to the
3650-3700 MHz Government Transfer Band, Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 6502 (Mar. 10, 2005); PATRICIA MOLONEY FIGLIOLA, CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERV., BROADBAND OVER POWERLINES: REGULATORY AND POLICY ISSUES (2004),
http://www.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32421 _20040604.pdf.
8 Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2695-99; Cable Ruling, supra note 2, 8-40; DSL Ruling,
supra note 1,11 12-17.
9 See In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
(Second Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 T 129 (Apr. 7, 1980)
("[R]egulation of enhanced communications services would limit the kinds of services an
unregulated vendor could offer, restricting this fast-moving, competitive market.").
10 Even assuming that the rules in question initially were justified ... it is plain that
that justification has long since evaporated. The Commission's general rulemaking
power is expressly confined to promulgation of regulations that serve the public inter-
est[] .... Even a statute depending for its validity upon a premise extant at the time of
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However, critics fear that the FCC's Title II deregulation opened the door to
monopolies in the broadband Internet market." They contend that such mo-
nopoly power could create not only higher prices for consumers, but worse,
restrict Internet content based on the will of a small group of providers.' 2 This
criticism is extreme and misplaced.'3
Prior to the FCC's policy shift, the broadband market was competitive. 4
Consistent with that competition, Title 1I common-carrier deregulation is not a
freedom that will cause providers to automatically create and exercise monop-
oly power to the detriment of consumers and Internet content. Rather, the op-
posite holds true: given the present competitiveness in the market and increas-
enactment may become invalid if subsequently that predicate disappears.
Geller v. FCC, 610 F.2d 973, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curium) (citations omitted) (holding
that FCC regulations cannot continue after fulfillment of their purpose unless a fresh deter-
mination is made that the regulations continue to serve the public interest); see also Second
Computer Inquiry, supra note 9, 129.
1 See, e.g., Supreme Court Decision Seen as Boon to Cable Companies, 23 No. 3 AN-
DREWS COMPUTER & INTERNET LITG. REP. 3 (July 12, 2005) (noting that some commentators
think the result of Brand X will stifle innovation and democracy on the Internet); Yuki No-
guschi, Cable Firms Don't Have to Share Networks, Court Rules, WASH. POST, June 28,
2005, at D1; Supreme Court Rules Cable Companies Not Required to Share Broadband
Lines, DEMOCRACY Now (June 28, 2005),
http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=05/06/28/142258.
[T]he [Brand X] decision really creates a closed [l]nternet, diminishes the prospect of
the [I]nternet being what it could be, and it's an area where technology and its capabili-
ties for democracy are delimited by thoughtless government action. And it is not only
possible in Congress, but at the FCC, to get some of the safeguards that are necessary
to protect that from happening. Those are uphill battles, but I think it's going to shape
the agenda of a lot of the progressive organizations ...."
Id. (statement of Andrew Schwartzman, President & CEO, Media Access Project); Press
Release, Media Access Project, Media Access Project Issues Statement on Supreme Court
Order Granting Certiorari in Brand X v. FCC (Dec. 3, 2004),
http://www.mediaaccess.org/press/BrandX Release.pdf.
This is much more than an argument about economics. It is an important test of the
First Amendment in the age of the Internet. The outcome of this case will-quite liter-
ally-determine the future of the Internet as we know it. The right of citizens to send
and receive any content over the Internet depends on rules which allow them to take
full advantage of the open architecture of the Internet. If the Supreme Court rules
against Internet open access, cable companies will be able to block content at will for
political or financial reasons, and deny the public the ability to choose among compet-
ing Internet providers.
Id.
12 See generally sources cited supra note 11.
13 See Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2708 (finding that the FCC's reinterpretation was a rea-
sonable policy choice).
14 Donald Abelson, Chief, Int'l Bureau, Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, Address at RITE
Symposium (July 1, 2005), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-
259812Al.pdf (commenting on dramatic increases in Internet investment for the period
1994 to 2004, which he attributes in large part to FCC promotion of deployment though a
process of removing regulatory requirements).
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ing Internet access options from developing technologies, there is little threat
of a monopoly developing that could exercise the price and content controls
that critics fear." Furthermore, should the market fail and monopolies develop,
critics' fears will still not come to fruition given the myriad of other regulatory
safeguards already in existence, such as antitrust law and the FCC's Title I an-
cillary authority provided under the Communications Act of 1934 ("1934
Act"). 6 Given the probable benefit to consumers, with minimal threats to price
or content, the FCC's deregulation of the broadband Internet market should be
lauded as a benefit to consumers and allowed to continue without further inter-
ference. 7
This Comment will demonstrate how consumers stand to benefit from the
FCC's Title II deregulation of the broadband market. First, this Comment will
provide the reader with a background on the development of broadband Inter-
net technology and the regulations that accompanied that development. Sec-
ond, this Comment will address competition in the broadband market and iden-
tify the benefits consumers are likely to experience under recent FCC deregula-
tory decisions. Third, this author will defend the FCC's deregulatory approach
in the context of other regulatory safeguards in both communications and anti-
trust laws and illustrate how criticism of the Commission's decisions is mis-
placed. Finally, this Comment concludes with the proposition that because the
FCC has created safe long-term benefits for Americans through a deregulated
broadband marketplace, additional regulatory and legislative controls are un-
necessary at this time.
1I. BACKGROUND ON THE INTERNET MARKET
A. The Development of Internet Service as a Fungible Good
In the late 1960s, researchers in the Advanced Research Projects Agency
("ARPA"), a division of the U.S. Department of Defense ("DOD"), developed
a computer network known as ARPANET. 8 The network allowed defense con-
15 See id.
16 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-161 (2000); see discussion infra Part IV.
17 DELOITTE TECH., MEDIA & TELECOMMS., TMT TRENDS: PREDICTIONS, 2005 A Focus
ON THE WIRELINE SECTOR (2005),
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/Wireline_F1NAL_01 FEB05 LR FA LOCKE
D.pdf ("On average, customers at the end of the year will pay less money for more band-
width than they did at the beginning .... ").
18 A history of the Internet is available in many published sources. E.g., ACLU v. Reno,
929 F. Supp. 824, 830-31 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Michael W. Louden-
slager, Allowing Another Policeman on the Information Superhighway: State Interests and
Federalism on the Internet in the Face of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 17 BYU J. PUB.
L. 191, 257-63 (2003) (discussing the origins of the Internet); JAMES GILES & ROBERT CALL-
[Vol. 14
The Decline of Title II Common-Carrier Regulations
tractors, universities, and DOD staff who worked together on defense projects
to communicate electronically and share data between computers that were
geographically separate but connected by wires."
Early in the development of this computer sharing technology, the National
Science Foundation ("NSF") played a leading role in disseminating the tech-
nology beyond the DOD.2" By the late 1970s, the NSF had established its own
computer network, the NSFNET, across the United States." The NSF's work
allowed data sharing not for defense work, but for academic research.22 Some
universities developed local networks and NSFNET allowed those networks to
interconnect.23 This interconnectivity broadened the universities' data pooling
capabilities by allowing them to connect their local networks directly to the
NSFNET, which served as a hub for the larger system.2 ' The local networks
connections, called Network Access Points ("NAPs"), unified the research ef-
forts of various communities and fields.25
By the 1990s, similar data-sharing networks had developed outside of the
government and research fields.26 Commercial and private use of the network
developed as interconnectivity increased. 7 Individuals and homes would even-
tually also access the computer network.28 When NSFNET shut down in 1995,
the existing NAP network became known as the Internet.29
As use of the Internet proliferated throughout the various facets of society,
problems arose when separately-developed computer networks attempted to
connect. The networks communicated in different "languages" which affected
LIAU, HOW THE WEB WAS BORN (2002); CHISTOS J.P. MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., HISTORY OF THE
INTERNET: A CHRONOLOGY, 1843 TO THE PRESENT (1999).
19 Loudenslager, supra note 18, at 257-58.





25 See Gary C. Kessler, An Overview of TCP/IP Protocols and the Internet (2004),
http://www.garykessler.net/library/tcpip.html (discussing how the NSF originally estab-
lished four NAPs).
26 Loudenslager, supra note 18, at 261.
27 See id. at 260-61.
28 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 832-33 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
29 RITA TEHAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SPINNING THE WEB: THE HISTORY AND INFRA-
STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNET (1999),
http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/data/1999/upl-meta-crs- 1026/98-
649c_1999Aug12.htm. What started as single a computer network for government project
grew to incorporate many more networks and developed the collective name of the Internet
which in its most technical sense is a "'set of all interconnected IP networks'-the collec-
tion of several thousand local, regional, and global computer networks interconnected in real
time via the TCP/IP Internetworking Protocol suite .... Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom
On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1995), quoting
DANIEL P. DERN, THE INTERNET GUIDE FOR NEW USERS 16 (1994).
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the efficacy of exchanged data.3" Tim Berners-Lee, a researcher at the Euro-
pean Laboratory for Particle Physics in Geneva, developed a uniform indexing
scheme that standardized the way that computer networks communicated with
each other.3 These standardizations vastly increased the navigability of the
Internet by allowing computers in independently developed networks to trans-
mit data in a common computer language.32
By 1996, use of the Internet was prevalent and President Clinton introduced
the Next Generation Internet project-a plan to increase the reach and trans-
mission speed of the national network.33 The increased Internet navigability
afforded by standardization rendered Internet use considerably more appealing
to private entities and businesses who began to place their computers in the
public Internet domain.34 The number of users on the Internet grew rapidly
from 10 million in 1995 to roughly 150 million worldwide by 1999. 35 During
this expansion, smaller firms and individual home Internet users did not neces-
sarily desire, nor have the means, to pay the costs associated with creating their
own local networks and NAPs.36 These smaller businesses and homes created a
demand for shared NAPs to disperse these costs and in turn, gave birth to a
new service industry. 7
Firms and individuals soon began connecting to larger networks by using
Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") without having to create their own com-
puter network and independent NAPs.30 ISPs capitalized on the new demand
and lack of resources of smaller consumers by creating their own NAP, by sell-
ing shared access to local ISP-owned NAPs.39 By March 1999, there were
about 5000 ISPs, compared to only 1500 in mid-1996.4 ° The commercialization
of shared-NAP use has become very profitable over time as more and more
consumers have been attracted by advances in Internet browser technology,
30 See Loudenslager, supra note 18, at 262; Kessler, supra note 25.
31 Bemers-Lee created the modem text formatting system called the Hypertext Markup
Language ("HTML"), a communication standard called the Hypertext Transfer Protocol
("HTTP") and an addressing framework to locate websites called the Universal Resource
Locator ("URL"). See generally TIM BERNERS-LEE, WEAVING THE WEB (1999).
32 TEHAN, supra note 29. HTTP is widely used a protocol or procedure for transmitting
data that provides this common computer language. Id.
33 Id. (indicating that this was a novel approach compared to previous technology ad-
vances which increased speed by improvements to individual computers rather than the
network).
34 Id.
35 CABLE SERVS. BUREAU, FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, BROADBAND TODAY 16 (1999),
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/Reports/broadbandtoday.pdf [hereinafter BROADBAND
TODAY].






2006] The Decline of Title 11 Common-Carrier Regulations 433
transmission speeds, and the ability to send and process more complex data."
B. Internet Service and the Advantages of Broadband
Originally, the majority of residential Internet users in the United States ac-
cessed the Internet over the same telephone lines.n2 Through the use of a com-
puter modem, consumers could "dial up" and access a local ISP-owned NAP.
The modem would convert the analog voice signals into digital data, allowing
the transmission of data from one personal computer to another connected to
the Internet.43 As Internet use increased, ISPs competed for business by offer-
ing service that allowed for faster data transmission speeds. 4
Broadband has developed as a type of high-speed Internet access that sup-
ports the transmission of data at speeds far greater than traditional dial-up ac-
cess.45 For ISP customers, this service is particularly attractive since files and
data that are transmitted across the Internet have become increasingly sophisti-
cated and complex, thereby taking longer to transmit.46 Additionally, broad-
band service has the time-saving benefit of not requiring a "dial-up" to the lo-
cal ISP, which is necessary with traditional, or narrowband, service.47 In effect,
broadband service is always "on."48 Increased transmission speed and constant
connectivity allow for a larger variety of computer applications to operate over
a broadband connection which increases the appeal of broadband Internet ser-
vice, especially to businesses.49
41 Id.
42 DSL Ruling, supra note 1, 34-40.
43 See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 489-90 (2002) (discussing how
an incumbent local exchange carrier operates and structurally allows for Internet access).
44 See DSL Ruling, supra note 1, T 34-40.
45 BROADBAND TODAY, supra note 35, at 19-21.
46 See ANGELE A. GILROY & LENNARD G. KRUGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BROAD-
BAND INTERNET ACCESS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 1-2 (2006),
http://www.opencrs.com/rpts/IB 10045 20060126.pdf [hereinafter BROADBAND INTERNET
ACCESS]. To put this increased speed in context, whereas the download of a large software
file, using the fastest dial-up modem available, a 56K, on traditional telephone or wireline
service, could take several minutes, the download of that same file using broadband service
would take mere seconds. Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 See BROADBAND TODAY, supra note 35, at 19-21.
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III. THE TREND TOWARD MORE COMPETITIVE REGULATION OF
THE BROADBAND MARKET
A. Communications Act of 1934 and Initial Regulation of Telecommunications
Services
Prior to 1934, the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") regulated the
communications industry, which at that time consisted primarily of telegraph
companies." Ineffective industry oversight on the part of the ICC, however,
caused Congress to pass the 1934 Act, marking the beginning of the current
communications regulatory scheme.5 The 1934 Act established the FCC and
conferred upon it the power to regulate interstate communications subject to
certain limitations. 2
In the decades following the passage of the 1934 Act, the most dramatic
regulation and policy changes regarding communications came from the U.S.
Department of Justice's Antitrust Division ("DOJ") and private party suits un-
der the antitrust laws. 3 In 1974, MCI, Inc. ("MCI") filed suit against AT&T,
which questioned the traditional mindset then prevalent in the communications
field: that the public is best served by a single monopoly providing universal
service throughout the nation.14 By the late 1980s, the development of numer-
ous technologies in the communications field resulted in the scrutiny of this
"natural monopoly" theory. Eventually, experts agreed that this theory was not
in the public interest.5 Many of the new technologies were clearly the product
of competitive innovation. 6 The dramatic industry changes since 1934 thus
50 HANK BRANDS & EVAN T. LEO, THE LAW AND REGULATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CARRIERS 2-5 (Artech House) (1999) (discussing the history and development of the tele-
communications regulation).
51 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 109-80, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
52 Id. § 152(b) ("[Excepting FCC regulation of] charges, classifications, practices, ser-
vices, facilities, or regulations for or in connection with intrastate communication service by
wire or radio of any carrier.").
53 There were several attempts to bring down the AT&T monopoly that were much
more dramatic than some of the landmark FCC cases in this time period which dealt with
less glamorous interpretations of the 1934 Act especially as it dealt with new hardware
technology. See, e.g., Hush-a-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956)
(dealing with FCC interpretation of the meaning of the 1934 Act with regard to add-on
products for telephones not manufactured by the telephone company). For a discussion of
the break of AT&T and antitrust regulation of the telecommunications industry in-between
1934 and 1996, see RAY G. BESING, WHO BROKE UP AT&T? FROM MA BELL TO THE INTER-
NET (2000).
54 See JAMES K. SHAW, TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION AND THE INFORMATION
ECONOMY 3 (2001).
55 Id.
56 Id. at 3; see Verizon Commc'ns v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002) (discussing the theory
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prompted Congress to overhaul its legislation in the area of telecommunica-
tions."
B. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Its Impact on Internet Regulation
Concern over the monopolistic nature of the telecommunications industry,
along with the development of new technologies, motivated Congress to pass
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 on February 8, 1996.58 The 1996 Act sig-
nificantly modified, but did not replace, the 1934 Act. The 1996 Act declared a
dual purpose: "to promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure
lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications
consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications
technologies."'5 9
Title II sought to further a more competitive telecommunications market by
requiring that certain incumbent telecommunications companies open their
facilities to competitors. 60 This mandatory access afforded under the 1996 Act,
however, imposed the restriction only on common-carriers-a pivotal classifi-
cation." Traditionally, telephone companies were not regulated as purely pri-
vate entities, but were considered public utilities.62 As public utilities, tele-
phone companies were, and continue to be, treated as common-carriers in vari-
ous regulatory schemes.63 By contrast, cable arose in the 1970s and, because of
the type of subscription based service they offered, regulatory frameworks do
not consider cable companies common-carriers to the same extent as telephone
companies.' The different origins and regulatory treatment of cable companies
of a natural monopoly in dealing with telecommunications companies as a public utility
wherein a certain level of costs from monopoly power are acceptable because of the univer-
sal need of the product that can best be filled by a single, uniform provider).
57 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered section of 47 U.S.C.).
58 See id.; see also Deonne L. Bruning, The Telecommunications Act of 1996: The Chal-
lenge of Competition, CREIGHTON L. REv. 1255, 1256-58 (1997) (summarizing the legisla-
tive enactment of the 1996 Act).
59 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered section of 47 U.S.C.); accord H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 113
(1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124.
60 See Bruning, supra note 58, at 1255-58; 47 U.S.C. § 201 (2000); see also id. § 160
(granting the FCC power to suspend certain provisions if forbearance would promote com-
petition).
61 See, e.g., Cable Ruling, supra note 2, 31-40.
62 See JoAnne Holman & Michael A. McGregor, The Internet as Commons: The Issue
of Access, 10 COMM. L. & POL'Y 267, 279-81 (2005) (discussing how as early as the ICC
regulations promulgated under the Interstate Commerce Act of 1897, regulations have effec-
tively classified the telephone industry as a public utility and a common carrier).
63 See id.
64 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 541(c)-(d).
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and telephone companies did not raise concerns when their services were dis-
tinctly video programming and voice communication, respectively.65 Neverthe-
less, the different treatment has raised greater concerns in recent years as both
traditional phone and cable companies have expanded and diversified their
businesses by offering broadband services.66
C. FCC Interpretations of Common-Carrier Requirements and the 1996 Act
The definitions provided by the 1996 Act significantly impact the applicabil-
ity of Title 1I common-carrier regulations. 67 The 1996 Act distinguishes firms
as providing either telecommunications services or information services.68
Reading the 1996 Act definitions together, a telecommunications carrier is de-
fined as offering "telecommunications services" and "shall be treated as a
common carrier .... ,169 Telecommunications service "means the transmission,
between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user's
choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and
received.""0 In contrast, an "information service" provider offers the "capability
for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utiliz-
ing, or making available information via telecommunications, and includes
electronic publishing, but does not include any use of any such capability for
the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the
management of a telecommunications service."" This definitional distinction
creates a tangible difference between companies that act as mere conduits for
telecommunications and ones that manipulate or enhance the communication
provided.72
With the 1996 Act amendments in place, the FCC had the responsibility to
interpret exactly how to treat the various types of Internet access services un-
65 See DSL Ruling, supra note 1, 47-64.
66 Id.
67 Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2706-
08 (2005).
68 Generally the 1996 Act covers "all interstate and foreign communication by wire or
radio" and seeing as how the whole point of the Internet was to connect geographically dis-
tant computers throughout the nation, the broadband Internet service at issue in this Com-
ment certainly falls within the general applicability of the statute. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a).
69 Id. § 153(43).
70 Id. § 153(44) (emphasis added); see Cable Ruling, supra note 2, 31-40 (discussing
the statutory definitions of telecommunications and telecommunications service).
71 47 U.S.C. § 153(20).
72 See, e.g., In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regu-
lations (Second Computer Inquiry), supra note 9, 86-97 (distinguishing between basic
service, which offers pure transmission capability, and enhanced service, which offers
something more, such as computer processing applications that manipulate content, code,
protocol, and other subscriber information).
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der these definitions.73 In March of 2002,"4 the FCC issued a Declaratory Rul-
ing ("Cable Ruling") on the definitional treatment of cable modem services.75
The Cable Ruling held that cable modem service offered the end user more
than data transmission capability. The Commission held that the integrated
services provided through cable qualified as an information service.
7 6
In reaching this conclusion, the Commission reviewed its earlier categoriza-
tion of ISPs." Previously, the FCC treated ISP providers that did not offer ser-
vice over their own lines as "information service providers" under the 1996
definitions. Those offering service over their own lines were classified as
"telecommunications carriers" under the 1996 Act definitions." Accordingly,
under this old interpretation, cable companies would be subject to Title II regu-
lations because the Internet access service they provide comes to customers
over their own lines.79
However, the FCC rejected this rationale in its Cable Ruling."° Instead, the
Commission decided that Internet access service offered by cable companies is
a "single service" offered to its customers and it is merely incidental that the
service is transmitted to customers over the cable company's own lines.8' Nev-
ertheless, the FCC attempted to reconcile this new approach with the old facili-
ties-based distinction." The FCC determined that cable modem service in-
volved data transport and access to its customers, thus a cable operators' in-
formation service capabilities are inextricably intertwined with data transport. 3
As a result of this inherent mix of services, the Commission distinguished ca-
73 See Cable Ruling, supra note 2, 75.
74 At this time the FCC was also reviewing its position on how to treat wireline broad-
band providers in a separate action. See In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access
to the Internet over Wireline Facilities; Universal Service Obligations of Broadband Provid-
ers; Computer Ill Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company Provision of En-
hanced Services; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of Computer III and ONA
Safeguards and Requirements, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 77 16-29
(Feb. 14, 2002) (requesting comments on the FCC's tentative position that wireline broad-
band Internet access service is an information service because the nature of accessing files
over the Internet is something more than just pure transmission); accord DSL Ruling, supra
note 1, 14 (ultimately finding that wireline broadband Internet access service is
an.information service).
75 Cable Ruling, supra note 2, 34-59.
76 Id. 138.
77 Id. TT 34-41.
78 See In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13
F.C.C.R. 11,501, 15, 55, 69 (Apr. 10, 1998) [hereinafter Universal Service Report].
79 Cable Ruling, supra note 2, 44.
80 See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688,
2703-04.
81 Cable Ruling, supra note 2, 38.
82 SeeBrandX, 125 S. Ct. at2708.
83 Universal Service Report, supra note 78, 80-81.
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ble modem service from pure transmission service.'
Looking at only the broadband offerings of a cable company, the FCC ruled
that despite being integrated with a pure transmission service, the Internet ser-
vice offerings were the same as those offered by other non-facilities-based
ISPs and should be similarly treated as an "information service" under the
1996 Act. 5 The effect of categorizing cable broadband Internet service as an
information service was to exempt the cable service from the Title II common-
carrier requirements.86 Among other things, the decision removed any require-
ment for cable modem providers to make their facilities available to other
ISPs. 7
Facing a potential cost increase in a multi-billion dollar industry if Internet
access rates were open to renegotiation, the ISPs chose to challenge the FCC's
Cable Ruling."8 Companies worried that the ruling would drastically reduce
competition in the broadband market.89 The Ninth Circuit reviewed this chal-
lenge and vacated the FCC's ruling, holding that the interpretation of the 1996
Act definitions was impermissible." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit justified its position by reasoning that principles of stare decisis bound
them to follow its earlier decision in AT&T v. Portland, where the Ninth Cir-
cuit previously determined that cable modem service was a "telecommunica-
tions service" under the 1996 Act.9' The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
fully address the validity of the FCC's decision to classify cable modem ser-
vice as a Title 1I information service.92
D. The Initial Impact of the Supreme Court's BrandXDecision
National Cable & Telecommunications Ass 'n v. Brand X challenged the
FCC's Cable Ruling and is perhaps most important not for the issue of admin-
istrative law it decided, but rather its effect on the broadband Internet market-
place. The case presented two legal questions to the Court: (1) what ability
84 See id.
85 Cable Ruling, supra note 2, 7.
86 BrandX, 125 S. Ct. at 2698.
87 See Cable Ruling, supra note 2, 48-52.
88 See TELECOMMS. INDUS. ASS'N, TIA's 2005 TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET REVIEW
AND FORECAST 114, tbl.llI-8.1 (2005) (showing 2004 Internet access revenues for all provid-
ers at $27.1 billion and forecasting that same number to be $35.2 billion by 2008) [hereinaf-
ter TIA MARKET REVIEW]; see also BROADBAND TODAY, supra note 35, at 16 (citing $300
billion in e-commerce revenues for 1998).
89 See BrandX, 125 S. Ct at 2708-09.
90 Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003).
91 Id. at 1128-29 (discussing AT&T v. Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 877-78).
92 FCC v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 655 (2004).
93 125 S. Ct. 2688.
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does an administrative agency have to refine its interstitial rule making; and (2)
whether the FCC's interpretation itself was permissible. Ultimately, the Court
decided that the FCC could effect a statutory reinterpretation and that the Ca-
ble Ruling was a valid exercise of this authority.9"
The question of law the Supreme Court decided in Brand X has great appli-
cability to the administrative law concept of judicial deference to agency inter-
pretations.95 However, the major impact of the case lies not in administrative
law, but in how the FCC's decision has altered the competitive structure of the
broadband Internet market.96 The primary criticism of the decision is that by
failing to impose common-carrier requirements, cable companies will face less
competition by refusing to share their networks with other ISPs and will sub-
sequently raise their rates.97 Some critics further suggest that broadband pro-
viders might gain sufficient power to censor the type of websites accessible on
the Internet based on content.98
94 Id. at 2699 (considering what standard of deference to apply to the FCC's interpreta-
tion). Respondents in the case argued, in part, that the FCC could not change its position to
be inconsistent with its previous rulings, but the Court expressly rejected this idea. See id. at
2711 (finding that it was permissible for the FCC to provide a fresh analysis of the defini-
tional interpretation issue in light of the circumstances of cable Internet service). The Court
upheld the FCC's Cable Ruling by relying on Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron prescribed a two-step analysis for reviewing a
statutory interpretation: the first asking whether the statue "directly addres[ses] the precise
question at issue" and second affording deference to the agency only if the interpretation is a
"reasonable policy choice." BrandX, 125 S. Ct. at 2702 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843,
845). The Court held that Congress left the 1996 Act definitions ambiguous as applied to
broadband. Congress did so knowing the statue was meant for implementation by an
agency, and thus must have intended for the agency to use its discretion in interpreting the
definitions. See id. at 2700. Moreover, after reviewing the broadband market, the Court
decided that the FCC's Cable Ruling was reasonable. Id. at 2708-10. In ultimately uphold-
ing the FCC Cable Ruling, the Court not only relied on the fact that the interpretation passed
the Chevron analysis, but also reasoned that applying stare decisis would produce too rigid a
statutory system that did not allow agencies to revise "unwise judicial constructions of am-
biguous statues." Thus, the Commission's interpretation was permissible. Id. at 2701.
95 There have been numerous cases reviewing FCC decisions under the Chevron test.
See, e.g., Metrophones Telecomms., Inc. v. Global Crossing Telecomms., Inc., 423 F.3d
1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2005); Eurodif S.A. v. United States, 423 F.3d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
96 See DSL Ruling, supra note 1, 1 1.
97 See, e.g., Supreme Court Decision Seen as Boon to Cable Companies, supra note 1 I
("'The Supreme Court's holding that Internet access over cable systems is not a telecommu-
nications service is a huge and disappointing loss for the American public. There should be
no mistake about that."' (quoting Andrew Schwartzman, President & CEO, Media Access
Project)); Noguchi, supra note 1 ("A key concern is that phone and cable companies could
potentially use their power over the network to act as gatekeepers of the Internet, discrimi-
nating and limiting consumers' access to certain services so that some Web sites and online
services are favored. Opponents of yesterday's ruling said they would push the FCC and
Capitol Hill to codify rules ensuring the "network neutrality" on the Internet.").
98 See generally sources cited supra note 11. These criticisms will be taken up below.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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E. Extension of BrandXto Wireline Broadband Internet Service
On August 5, 2005, less than a month after the Supreme Court handed down
the Brand X decision, the FCC issued a ruling analyzing and categorizing wire-
line broadband Internet access ("DSL Ruling").99 Similar to what the Commis-
sion's Cable Ruling did for cable Internet providers, the DSL Ruling brought
wireline broadband Internet providers, such as the traditional telephone com-
panies, outside of Title II common-carrier regulations.0 0 Several factors led the
FCC to this decision.' °' First, the Commission desired to create a uniform regu-
latory scheme for broadband Internet access across multiple platforms. 2 Act-
ing on this desire, the Commission issued the DSL Ruling in part to match the
regulatory treatment of cable broadband service with regard to Title 11.03 The
FCC also chose to deregulate wireline broadband Internet service because it
served the purpose of the 1996 Act-to promote competition and encourage
deployment of broadband technology."° Moreover, the FCC applied some of
the same reasoning utilized in the Cable Ruling. Since the broadband Internet
service offered by wireline providers is not merely a single service, but rather a
mix of computer processing applications and transmission, the service consti-
tutes a telecommunications service, not an information service, under the 1996
Act. 05
In the case of BrandXand the FCC's Cable Ruling, the Commission had is-
sued no previous classification of cable Internet service. 6 By contrast, the
99 DSL Ruling, supra note 1. Even before this time though, the Commission had been
making other decisions about IP-related services that seemed to indicate its preference for
deregulation and treating DSL as an information service. See generally In re Petition for
Declaratory Ruling That Pulver.com's Free World Dialup is Neither Telecommunications
Nor a Telecommunications Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 3307
(2004) (finding the Intemet application, Free World Dialup, to be an unregulated informa-
tion service); In re Petition of SBC Communications Inc. for Forbearance from the Applica-
tion of Title II Common Carrier Regulation to IP Platform Services, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 9361 (2005) (considering Title 11 relief for IP Platform Services,
though ultimately rejecting the petition because it was overly broad); In re Petition for De-
claratory Ruling that AT&T's Phone-to-Phone IP Telephony Services are Exempt from Ac-
cess Charges, Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 7457, 13 (2004) (finding that the IP-service at issue to
be a telecommunications service, but leaving the door open as to the issue of whether IP-
service platforms may evolve into enhanced service platforms qualifying as an information
service).
100 DSL Ruling, supra note 1, 169 (granting wireline providers "blanket certification"
to discontinue providing ISPs access to their transmission lines).
101 Id 99 1-4.
102 Id. 1-3.
103 Id. 9 1, 12.
104 Id. l.
105 Id. 14 (relying on Cable Ruling, supra note 2, 38).
106 See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688,
2697-99 (2005).
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FCC had previously categorized the wireline industry's service as a telecom-
munications service.' 7 Faced with the disparate treatment of Internet providers,
the Commission fully reviewed its previous rulings, along with the state of
competition in the broadband market, and determined that a change bringing
uniformity was appropriate.' 8 Given the high level of policy review the FCC
conducted in arriving at the DSL Order and the sweeping authority that the
Brand X case vests in administrative agencies to reevaluate its policies, there
seems to be little chance of success for a challenge against the DSL Ruling. 9
IV. CONSUMERS STAND TO BENEFIT FROM COMPETITION IN A
DEREGULATED BROADBAND MARKET
A. Consumers Already Enjoy Benefits from Wireline-Cable Competition and
Will Continue to Benefit Under the Recent FCC Deregulatory Decisions
As of early 2005, coaxial cable and an enhanced telephone service known as
a digital subscriber line ("DSL") constituted the primary methods of broadband
service offerings to consumers."0 Cable companies traditionally offering video
programming modified their lines in order to offer broadband Internet ser-
vice."' Cable broadband supports download speeds anywhere from 200,000
bits per second ("bps") to 6 million bits per second ("Mbps")." 2 Thus, broad-
band presents a drastic advance over narrowband, while dial-up service pro-
viders can offer only a maximum transmission speed of 45,000 bps."3 DSL
technology converts existing copper telephone lines into high-speed transmis-
107 See DSL Ruling, supra note 1, 19-46 (reviewing past FCC classification of wire-
line services as a telecommunications carrier service in light of changed circumstances in
the market leading it to find that its previous classification is no longer appropriate).
108 Id.
109 See BrandX, 125 S. Ct. at 2720 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the effect of
the majority decision is to grant an administrative agencies the power to disregard any pre-
vious construction, even those made by a court).
110 For a more technical description of broadband architectures, see Nosa Omoigui et al.,
Comparing Integrated Broadband Architectures from an Economic and Public Policy Per-
spective, in THE INTERNET AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY: SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE
1995 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH CONFERENCE 167, 185 (Gerald W. Brock &
Gregory L. Rosston eds., 1996) [hereinafter Broadband Architectures] (discussing in great
detail Hybrid Fiber-Coax ("HFC") and Fiber-to-the-Curb ("FTTC") delivery systems and
concluding based on economic models that cable companies are well-positioned to compete
with telephone companies for broadband networks).
"I See BROADBAND TODAY, supra note 35, at 23-24 (stating that operatives have to
build an entire Internet backbone network, including routers, servers and network manage-
ment tools).
112 BROADBAND INTERNET ACCESS, supra note 46, at 2.
113 Id. at 1 (calculating maximum for dial-up service using a 56k modem).
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sion lines and can transmit at speeds varying from 768 thousand bits per sec-
ond ("kbps") to 3 Mbps. ' 4 Both voice communications and computer data can
be transmitted over the same telephone lines because DSL uses frequencies
that are much higher than those used for voice communication."5
The cable infrastructure suffers a slight disadvantage since its lines are
shared by all users." 6 Sharing makes transmission speed variable based on the
number of users accessing the Internet from the same point or "node" at any
given time." 7 Furthermore, sharing creates a vulnerability to cable service
since third-parties may have the ability to access information intended to be
secure. ' DSL, on the other hand, creates a direct unshared line between the
customer and the ISP. As a result, the transmission speed remains constant,
regardless of how many other users are active. Accordingly, DSL also lacks
the shared line security issues of cable."'
Based on the most recent FCC data, the overwhelming majority of U.S. citi-
zens have a choice in broadband providers. 2 ° The statistics show: 5% of
Americans have no access to high-speed lines; 12% have access to high-speed
lines but only through one service provider; and 83% of the United States may
obtain high-speed access through more than one provider. 2 ' Competition be-
tween broadband service providers created sufficient incentive for this high
rate of deployment. This incentive will persist in a Title Il-free broadband
market where providers do not need to share the advantages of increased de-
ployment with other non-facilities-based ISPs.' 2 The effects of deregulating
DSL and cable will consistently continue until competition captures the last of
the unclaimed market where service is unavailable. Consequently, Americans
114 Id. at 3.
115 Id.
116 Broadband Architectures, supra note 110, at 188 (noting that HFC systems are highly
sensitive to bandwidth requirements making FTTC-based service more competitive in the
long run but contrasting that with the analysis that given the time it takes for telephone com-
panies to modify its systems, cable would be able to offer competitive services and even at
lower costs than the phone companies for some periods).
117 See, e.g., BROADBAND TODAY, supra note 35, at 19.
118 Id. at 2. However, as Internet browsers have increased their encryption level, this
threat has been significantly reduced, if not complexly eliminated. See Dan Froomkin &
Amy Branson, Deciphering Encryption, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, May 8, 1998,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/encryption/encryption.htm.
119 See BROADBAND INTERNET ACCESS, supra note 46, at 3.
120 See INDUSTRY ANALYSIS & TECHNOLOGY DIVISION, FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, HIGH-
SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2004 tbl.13 (July
2005), http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-
StateLink/IAD/hspdO7O5.pdf [hereinafter INDUSTRY ACCESS REPORT].
121 Id.
122 See id.; see also DSL Ruling, supra note 1, 75-76 (discussing incentives for fur-
ther development of broadband service offerings in the context of anticipated ISP agree-
ments).
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will reap the benefit of more complete high-speed Internet access deploy-
ment. 
23
Leaving the issue of deployment aside, the argument that a lack of competi-
tion in the broadband market will harm consumers is unsupported by current
data to the contrary.'24 Opponents of Brand X may argue that these numbers
simply do not reflect "real" competition."' Such an argument is predicated on
the belief that cable companies dominate by achieving the advantage of first-
entry into many areas. 26 However, this argument is outdated because it is only
supported by the early composition of the broadband market, prior to DSL in-
vestment and expansion.2 7 Based on early deployment data, it seems that cable
did dominate broadband service in the United States at a two-to-one margin
over DSL. 2 This was understandable since cable companies could provide
Internet service on their existing coaxial lines with only minor alterations. By
contrast, telephone companies faced extensive infrastructure upgrades before
they could provide broadband service-upgrades that were costly both in terms
of time and money.'29 Such an easy adjustment for cable companies, combined
with mergers in the industry, allowed cable to become the dominant player in
the broadband market and established a monopoly trend. 3
Nevertheless, cable companies have not maintained this dominance in the
broadband market because of the strides taken by wireline companies in offer-
ing DSL."3' In 1999, DSL represented only 13.4% of the broadband service
lines available. "2 By December 2005, DSL had grown to 36.5% of the market
and while this share is less than cable's 57%, it is large enough to present
123 See BROADBAND TODAY, supra note 35, at 26-27 (discussing deployment trends re-
sulting from cable and DSL competition).
124 See INDUSTRY ACCESS REPORT, supra note 120, tbl. 13.
125 Reza Dibadj, Toward Meaningful Cable Competition: Getting Beyond the Monopoly
Morass, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 245, 268 (2002-2003) (citing INDUSTRY ANALYSIS
& TECHNOLOGY DIVISION, FED. COMMC'N COMM'N, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET
ACCESS: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2002 (Dec. 2002),
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-
State Link/IAD/hspdl2O2.pdf).
126 See id. at 272-73.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 273 (acknowledging the slow growth of DSL and that in limited areas it was
beginning to offer "some competition to cable").
130 See id. at 276-77 (highlighting that cable companies merging to increase economies
of scale were charging higher rates and not passing along the cost efficiencies along to con-
sumers).
131 See TIA MARKET REVIEW, supra note 88, at Ill tbl.Ill-8.7 (showing how DSL has
closed the gap in broadband subscribers from 5.3 million to 4.4 million and predicting the
gap to continue to close).
132 INDUSTRY ACCESS REPORT, supra note 120, chart 2.
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meaningful competition.'33 The actual competition between cable and DSL
broadband service directly undercuts criticism of the deregulated broadband
market.'34 With 352 DSL providers and 147 cable broadband providers, an in-
crease from twenty-eight and forty-three respectively six years ago, fears that
providers will collude to establish monopoly control over the Internet seems
increasingly unlikely considering the number of players involved.3
This real and significant competition has not only spread faster Internet ser-
vices to more Americans through deployment efforts, but has also decreased
consumer costs.'36 Prices have dramatically decreased as DSL and cable mo-
dem services have competed for consumer dollars. DSL service decreased its
average monthly prices by 13.7% in 2003 and cable promptly responded by
lowering its prices by 9.5% in 2004.' The FCC's Title 1I deregulation has re-
moved the remaining common-carrier barriers to competition between cable
and DSL service. Consequently, consumers can expect to see continued advan-
tages not just in price and deployment, but also in technological advancements
as these service providers attempt to capture a larger share of subscribers by
offering new, higher quality services.'
B. Title II Deregulation Will Promote Advancements in Broadband
Technology Beyond DSL and Cable, Bringing Mobility and Additional Price
Benefits to Consumers
While cable and DSL are presently the primary means for consumers to pur-
chase broadband access to the Internet, other broadband technologies are in
development and promise to provide more broadband choices for consumers. 139
The FCC's decisions to remove cable and DSL service from Title II regulation
will increase incentives to develop these other technologies, especially if cable
and DSL providers imprudently raise prices or exclude ISPs from their trans-
mission facilities.'4
0
One type of developing technology is wireless broadband Internet service
offered through several technology options. 4 ' One technology option termed
"Wi-fi" allows for broadcast local multipoint distribution service-commonly
33 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at tbl.6.
136 See TIA MARKET REVIEW, supra note 88, at 107-09.
137 See id. at 108-09.
138 See id. at 107-09.
139 See, e.g., id. at 4-5, 109-12; BROADBAND TODAY, supra note 35, at 21-22.
140 See DSL Ruling, supra note 1, at 75 (noting independent ISPs need for broadband
transmission methods at reasonable prices).
141 See, e.g., TIA MARKET REVIEW, supra note 88, at 109.
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referred to as "LMDS"-over an area of five km to 6.5 km.'42 Another option
termed "Wi-max" allows for multichannel multipoint distribution service-
commonly referred to as "MMDS"-which has wireless line of sight coverage
of up to thirty miles.'43 Wi-fi and Wi-max differ significantly in that Wi-fi is
available over greater distances but it requires line of sight to operate at maxi-
mum ranges, while Wi-max has shorter ranges but is not handicapped by line
of sight limitations.'" Given these differences, Wi-max service is an ideal
competitor for cable and DSL broadband service in an urban environment with
high population densities because the technology can provide service to many
customers within a small radius without wires and line of site.'45 On the other
hand, Wi-fi makes an ideal competitor for broadband service in rural settings.
Rural locations tend to have fewer obstacles interfering with the broadcast sig-
nal and lower population densities which increases the per capita cost of de-
ploying wireline or cable facilities.'46 Wi-fi and Wi-max technologies are supe-
rior to cable and DSL broadband in some respects because they have lower
facility costs and can deploy quickly due to the inherent wireless nature of the
service. '
Another wireless technology option is broadband service provided via satel-
lite. 148 As of 2005, satellite broadband Internet service is offered principally by
two companies: Starband Communications Inc. and Hughes Network Systems,
LLC. Satellite service allows customers to connect to an ISP from virtually
anywhere.'49 The drawback to this technology is that it is subject to compro-
mised performance in bad weather and it is also a shared technology that, like
cable, has some degree of inherent vulnerability to unauthorized access."' Fur-
thermore, the current satellite offerings only allow for 56 kbps, which com-
pared with the 6 Mbps and 3 Mbps offered by cable and DSL broadband re-
spectively, is rather slow. 5' Nevertheless, satellite high-speed Internet sub-
scribers are projected to increase from 400,000 in 2004 to 1.1 million in
2008.' As subscribers increase, the revenues will provide these satellite com-
panies with the financial resources to expand further.
142 See id. at 109-10; BROADBAND TODAY, supra note 35 at 29-30.
"43 See, e.g., TIA MARKET REVIEW, supra note 88, at 109-10.
144 Id. at 110.
145 Id. Line of sight here means "the straight path between a transmitting antenna (as for
radio or television signals) and a receiving antenna when unobstructed by the horizon."
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 724 (11 th ed. 2003).
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 1l1.
149 See id.
10 BROADBAND INTERNET ACCESS, supra note 46, at 3.




A third wireless broadband service option is called mobile wireless and is
provided over the existing wireless telephone service infrastructure.'53 Known
as third generation ("3G") service, this is a mobile wireless technology that
offers broadband to consumers over cell phones, personal digital assistants,
and wireless modem computers cards. 5 4 Evolution Data Only ("EvDO") is one
such technology and operates over mobile phone cell networks, allowing cus-
tomers to receive continuous Internet service over great distances, to the same
extent they receive cell phone service.'55 Although EvDO technology requires
cell phone companies to purchase additional bandwidth, several companies
already offer such service.'56
There are also several types of wireline technologies entering the market and
serving a growing share of subscribers.'57 Fiber-to-the-Home ("FTTH") is one
such wireline alternative to DSL and cable. FTTH is expected to become a di-
rect competitor of other wireline services as the technology experiences de-
creasing costs and faster transmission rates.'58 FTTH would be a vast im-
provement over current cable and DSL service offerings in terms of speed:
FTTH has the potential to offer at least 0.6 billion bits per second, at least four
orders of magnitude faster than voice grade modems.'59 The major hindrance to
this technology, however, is that it requires an outlay of entirely new wire-
based facilities. Similar to the case of DSL, FTTH deployment can be slowed
by high costs and even entirely impractical from a business standpoint in low
subscription areas. 6 However, the future of this technology looks promising as
current bandwidth offerings available are reaching their limits and costs of
FTTH deployment continue to fall. 6'
The final significant developing broadband technology is called broadband
over power lines ("BPL"). As the name suggests, the service allows customers
153 ld
154 See id.
155 Christopher Stem, A New Wireless Web Link, Phone Firms Testing High-Speed
Technology Called EvDO, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2003, at E01.
156 TIA MARKET REVIEW, supra note 88, at 11. Verizon began offering EvDo service in
2003 and Sprint began in 2004. Id.
157 See, e.g., id. at 110-12.
158 Id at 110.




160 Id at 12 ("[S]trong disincentive to paying for improving the facilities, only to suffer
immediately loss of any competitive advantage in doing so.").
161 PETER JEW, FTTH COUNCIL, THE TIME FOR FIBER-TO-THE-HOME is Now, OPASTCO
ROUNDTABLE (2002),
http://www.ftthcouncil.org/documents/Time%20for/ 2OFTTH%20is%20NOW.pdf (report-
ing decrease in FTTH deployment across the board in splitters/couplers, splicing, cable,
photonics, and labor); see also GREEN, supra note 159, at 12.
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to gain access to broadband Internet over power lines by simply plugging a
modem into an electrical socket. 62 The benefit of this technology is that it can
be made available to every building that has electricity. In application, it is a
service that could be far more prevalent than cable or DSL because electricity
is so ubiquitous.63 The FCC has already issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing to investigate BPL deployment. 6 With this technology growing, and ex-
pected to reach 300,000 customers by 2008, BPL represents yet another com-
petitor in the broadband market over facilities completely different from tradi-
tional cable and DSL services. 65 The greatest advantage of BPL is that the
costs of deployment are low because electric lines are already deployed
throughout America. Therefore, the service could compete wherever cable and
DSL is offered. Furthermore, the technology could more easily achieve full
deployment to the remaining areas of the country currently without broad-
band. 66 BPL, if widely deployed, would certainly contribute to the competitive
landscape offering service at speeds of 200 kbps for around $30 per month. 67
When viewed as a whole, the market for broadband service has many new
entrants on the horizon.16 These competitors will place pressure on cable and
DSL services not only to offer lower prices, but also to maintain content ac-
cess.' 69 The FCC has been correct before when choosing to rely on market
forces to promote development of new technologies and its reliance here is
equally as justified. 7 ° If DSL and cable were to exercise monopoly power ei-
162 TIA MARKET REVIEW, supra note 88, at 111.
163 Id.
'64 In re Carrier Current Systems, Including Broadband over Power Line Systems;
Amendment of Part 15 regarding new requirements and measurement guidelines for Access
Broadband over Power Line Systems, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 F.C.C.R. 3335
(Feb. 12, 2004).
165 TIA MARKET REVIEW, supra note 88, at 112 (predicting more drastic growth to sub-
scriber numbers beyond 2008 as changes are made to the power facilities to support a full
strength broadband signal at greater distances from the source).
166 See FIGLIOLA, supra note 7, at 7.
167 See Maria L. Henriques, Electrifying Ease, if Not Speed, WASH. POST. July 10, 2005,
at F06 (pricing based on select test markets).
168 See TIA MARKET REVIEW, supra note 88, at 109-12.
169 See discussion supra Part III.
170 In re Application of WorldCom, Inc. and MCI Communications Corp. for Transfer of
Control of MCI Communications Corp. to WorldCom, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 18,025, 64 (Sept. 14, 1998) [hereinafter WorldCom-MCI Merger]. In
1998, WorldCom sought to merge with MCI and concentrate the then existing facilities for
the national Internet fiber network in the hands of but a few corporations. Id. 2-7. The
FCC ultimately approved the merger but did so in part relying on the predictions that new
technologies would see increased deployment and thus create competition capable of con-
straining any exercise of monopoly power by the dominant post merger entity. Id. 64. The
reliance here in the broadband market forces is thus not a new concept, but rather one that




ther in regard to price or content after Title 1I deregulation with so many alter-
native providers emerging, demand would simply shift a larger market share to
these new technologies. This shift would maintain low prices and freedom in
Internet content that consumers currently enjoy.'7'
The FCC's Title 1I deregulation merely recognizes the fact that the broad-
band market has developed into a healthy, competitive, and efficient market.'
As seen in Chart 1, new broadband technologies are in their infancy, but they
continue to compete against and curtail the growth of the DSL and cable mar-
ket share. These new technologies will inevitably geographically overlap with
existing DSL and cable service as their market shares grow, and incentives to
lower prices and attract customers in these overlapping territories will continue
to be strong.'
Chart 1: Broadband Internet Subscribers in the United States (in Millions)'74
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171 See TIA MARKET REVIEW, supra note 88, at 111 tbl.llI-8.8 (predicting continued
growth of all broadband technologies).
172 See DSL Ruling, supra note 1, at 15,108 (Abernathy, Comm'r, concurring).
173 See id. T 90-95.
174 TIA MARKET REVIEW, supra note 88, at 111 tbl.IIl-8.7.
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C. Increased Competition Resulting from Title II Deregulation Will Have the
Additional Benefit of Attracting More Capital Investment to Continue
Advancing Service Options
One of the largest burdens associated with Title II common-carrier regula-
tions was its deterrent effect on capital investments in the broadband market. 75
The central rationale supporting this conclusion relies on the notion that firms
will only invest when profits are certain.76 A company will aggressively seek
to expand its services when it knows it can capture substantial revenues to
cover the costs associated with expansion."' However, the broadband situation
under Title II regulations allowed unassociated, non-facilities-based ISPs to
enjoy open access to transmission lines, effectively making them free-riders to
broadband companies.' Title 11 created only short-term superficial competi-
tion and price controls by forcing wireline providers to share their facilities. In
creating only these short-term benefits, the regulation sacrificed the develop-
ment of more sophisticated services by reducing long-term incentives to com-
pete for a comparative advantage through expansion and capital investment.'79
Title II common-carrier regulations eliminated the traditional competitive ad-
vantage incentives for capital investment by allowing ISPs to benefit from any
network advancements made by the facilities owners without assuming any of
the financial risk involved.8 Now free from Title II restrictions, DSL provid-
ers are more competitive with cable providers because the FCC provided DSL
companies with the freedom to capture the appropriate returns on their invest-
ments.'8 '
175 See DSL Ruling, supra note 1, 89.
176 See, e.g., Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002).
177 See, e.g., Thomas M. Jorde, J. Gregory Sidak, & David J. Teece, Innovation, Invest-
ment, and Unbundling, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 8 (2000) ("It makes no economic sense for [a
facilities-based provider] to invest in technologies that lower its marginal costs, so long as
competitors can achieve the identical cost savings by regulatory fiat."); J. Gregory Sidak &
Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulation and Managed Competition in Network Industries, 15 YALE
J. ON REG. 117, 124-25 (1998) ("If deprived of a return to capital facilities after capital has
been sunk in irreversible investments, or if faced with reduced returns to investments al-
ready made, any economically rational company will eliminate or reduce similar capital
investments in the future."); AT&T Scoffs at Possible Common Carrier Statutes, T.R.
DAILY, Nov. 9, 1998, 1998 WLNR 3886003 ("'No company will invest billions of dollars..
• if competitors who have not invested a penny of capital, nor taken an ounce of risk, can
come along and get a free ride on the investments and risks of others."' (quoting C. Michael
Armstrong, Chairman & CEO, AT&T)).
178 See DSL Ruling, supra note 1, 71 (acknowledging Verizon's inability to deliver




181 See DSL Ruling, supra note 1, 71-72.
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With the removal of Title II restrictions under Brand X, consumers are cer-
tain to see more investment in infrastructure and the corollary tangible benefits
of increased transmission speed and lower prices.'82 Studies in other areas of
telecommunications have already confirmed that deregulation produces posi-
tive economic effects similar to those that are anticipated in the broadband
context. 3
As revenues have become more certain for wireline investment, revenues for
non-facilities-based ISPs have become less certain now that they can be ex-
cluded from DSL and cable transmission facilities. 4 The question is what
choices do these ISPs have for the long-term viability of their companies? Ex-
isting cable and DSL broadband providers now have competitive incentives to
form private agreements with independent ISP providers where these providers
offer Internet options that customers value."5 In the event that ISPs cannot
agree on terms with DSL and cable providers, they may also seek to fulfill
their transmission and business needs by making similar agreements with de-
veloping technologies.'86 To the extent that consumers desire independent ISP
service, there will be significant incentive for DSL, cable, and developing tech-
nology service providers to add or keep ISPs in their network to attract more
customers through a diverse service offering. 7
Just weeks after the Brand X decision, this predicted increase of capital in-
vestment in broadband facilities and ISP agreements came to fruition in the
marketplace. Google, Inc., along with contributions from The Hearst Corpora-
tion and The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., invested an estimated $100 million
in Current Communications Group, a start-up company offering BPL service.'
Brand X provided an impetus for ISPs to assist in the development of addi-
tional technologies and advances in cable and DSL service.' 9 This potential
increase in demand for additional technologies will be a windfall for consum-
ers in that it will lead to lower prices and more service options through in-
182 Supreme Court Decision Seen as Boon to Cable Companies, supra note 11 ("'When
telecommunications companies can be assured that they will control access to their own
networks and be able to set prices accordingly, we can expect to see a significant increase in
funds invested in broadband deployment .... "' (quoting Braden Cox, technology counsel
for the Competitive Enterprise Institute, a non-profit public policy group)).
183 See, e.g., Study Sees Economic Benefits in Telecom Deregulation, 7 No. 26 ANDREWS
TELECOMM. INDus. LITIG. REP. 12 (2004) (reporting on a recent study by Decision Econom-
ics, Inc. entitled "Macroeconomic Effects of Telecommunications Deregulation").
184 See BROADBAND TODAY, supra note 35, at 33-36.
185 See DSL Ruling, supra note 1, 72-73.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Dawn Kawamoto, Google Invests in Power-Line Broadband, CNET NEWS.COM, July
7, 2005, http://news.com.com/Google+invests+in+power-line+broadband/2100-10363-
5777917.html (supporting reported investments with data from the Wall Street Journal).
189 See DSL Ruling, supra note 1, $ 72.
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creased competition. 9 '
V. FCC TITLE II DEREGULATION WAS AN APPROPRIATE COURSE
OF ACTION
A. Title I Ancillary Jurisdiction Gives the FCC Authority to Intervene Should
the Market Fail
As demonstrated, consumer interests have been favored by the Brand X de-
regulation of cable and DSL broadband service through such potential tangible
benefits as price reductions, deployment, and new technology options. 9 ' Al-
though Brand X affirms Title II deregulation, it does not entirely subject con-
sumers to the whims of the market.'92 The Court has acknowledged that the
FCC still retains the authority to make regulations under Title I ancillary juris-
diction.'93 This ancillary jurisdiction gives the FCC flexibility to create addi-
tional regulatory safeguards on a case-by-case basis under the present sys-
tem.'94 Consequently, in the event that the Title II deregulation results in an
unlikely and unforeseen market failure that is harmful to consumers, the FCC
has the ability to take remedial measures under Title I-thus, any deregulation
risks to consumers are minimal.'95
B. Antitrust Law Provides Another Safeguard in the Event the Market Fails to
Provide Anticipated Benefits to Customers
While there is ample competition in the broadband market to sustain and ex-
pand broadband benefits for consumers, this Comment would not be realistic if
it did not recognize the possibility that unknown variables could lead to a fail-
ure in the Internet market despite data trends to the contrary.'96 The possibility
190 See id. at 15,108-09 (Abernathy, Comm'r, concurring) ("The result of such competi-
tion will be better and better services at lower and lower prices, with offerings designed to
match customers' needs rather than regulators' preferences.").
191 See discussion infra Part III.
192 See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688,
2711 (2005).
193 Id.
194 See 47 U.S.C. § 160 (2000).
195 See DSL Ruling, supra note 1, 109 ("We recognize that both of the predicates for
ancillary jurisdiction are likely satisfied for any consumer protection ... that we may subse-
quently decide to impose on wireline broadband Internet access service providers."); see
also id. 110 (extending Title I jurisdiction not just to DSL providers but all broadband
Internet access services).
196 See generally TIA MARKET REVIEW, supra note 88, at 106-14 (providing statistical
support for the present level of competition).
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of failed competition resulting under Title 1I deregulation does not mean that
consumers would suffer from an oppressive monopoly in the broadband mar-
ket. "'97 Aside from Title I ancillary jurisdiction, consumers will be protected by
the application of antitrust law to broadband service arrangements." 8 Through
the FCC's own review of anticompetitive behavior and the similar regulatory
work of antitrust authorities, such as the DOJ and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion ("FTC"), sufficient oversight of the market exists to guard against abuses
of the Title I deregulation.'99
Congress, in passing the 1996 Act, specifically included a provision that
dealt with the 1996 Act's interaction with antitrust laws: "nothing in [the] Act
or the amendments made by the [1934] Act or the amendments made by this
[1996] Act shall be construed to modify, impair or supersede the applicability
of any of the antitrust laws."2 ° Congress initially manifested its desire to pre-
vent monopolies by imposing the common-carrier requirements, but the pre-
sent Title II deregulation does not diverge from this intent. Instead, the present
deregulation merely recognizes that market forces alone are now enough to
prevent monopolies."' As noted by the Supreme Court, the intent behind the
1996 Act is more "ambitious" than the intent of antitrust laws; the latter merely
intended to prevent unlawful monopolization, whereas the 1996 Act attacks all
monopolization. 2 However, even the "less ambitious" antitrust laws are suffi-
cient to prevent the same types of monopolies that the 1996 Act sought to pre-
vent. A priori consumers would abhor content restrictions on the Internet since
freedom of content has been one of the Internet's most valuable attributes.2 °3
Consequently, the incentives for a broadband provider to satisfy consumer
preferences for free content would be so strong that to oppose them would ne-
197 See Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S.
398, 406-07 (2004).
198 Id.
199 See, e.g., WorldCom-MCI Merger, supra note 170, T 10-11; 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21
(2000) (discussing the shared jurisdiction for competition review between the DOJ and
FTC).
200 Applicability Consent Decrees and Other Law, Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. IV, § 601,
110 Stat. 143 (1996).
201 See DSL Ruling, supra note 1, 77-80.
202 Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 415.
203 See, e.g., Michael Copps, Comm'r, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Remarks at the New
America Foundation: The Beginning of the End of the Internet? Discrimination, Closed
Networks and the Future of Cyberspace (Oct. 9, 2003),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatchDOC-239800A 1 .pdf.
Americans take pride in their Internet. From right to left, Republicans and Democrats,
rural and urban, we view the Internet as a place of freedom where new technologies
and business innovation and competition flourish .... This freedom has always been at
the heart of what the Internet community and its creators celebrate.
Id.
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cessitate an unlawful monopoly under antitrust law norms."4 Therefore, even
the minimal intent behind antitrust law to ban only "unlawful" monopolies
provides a sufficient safeguard against content restrictions should the Title Ii
deregulatory competition fail to eliminate monopolistic forces in the broadband
market altogether.0 5
Within the realm of antitrust law, the FCC has concurrent jurisdiction along
with the DOJ and the FTC for review of mergers involving telecommunica-
tions companies.0 6 The merger of MCI and WorldCom in 1997 was the first
major vertical merger in Internet infrastructure companies0 7 and illustrates how
the FCC and antitrust law can protect consumers. In evaluating this merger, the
FCC looked to whether it would "serve the public interest, convenience and
necessity" before acquiescing to the transaction.0 Under the relevant statutes,
the FCC concluded that "neither the present nor future public convenience and
necessity will be adversely affected" by the merger.20 9 In reaching this determi-
nation, the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence rests with the
parties applying for the merger."' 0 The FCC can conditionally approve a merger
204 See DSL Ruling, supra note 1, 79 (noting the sufficiency of marketplace incentives
to offer new services).
205 See Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 405-07. Whether or not additional legislation is
needed to ensure net neutrality is currently a hotly debated issue. See, e.g., Greg Piper, Pub-
lic Wants Govt. to Ensure Net Neutrality, Consumer Groups Say, COMM. DAILY, Jan. 19,
2006, at 7 ("Proposals on the Hill and at the FCC on net neutrality 'fall far short of what is
needed,' said Consumers Union Senior Policy Analyst Jeannine Kenney."); J.M., Commcast
Executives focused on VoIP Plans During a Conference Call, COMM. DAILY, Feb. 3, 2006,
at 11 ("[Comcast] CEO Brian Roberts lashed out. 'We continue to believe that proponents
of so called net neutrality are pursuing a solution in search of a problem,' he said, adding
Comcast has never blocked access to websites. 'We're certainly going to try to fight any-
thing like that."'); Anne Veigle & Edie Herman, Verizon Urges House to Split Franchising
from Telecom Bill, COMM. DAILY, Jan. 30, 2006, at 2 ("[Verizon Executive Vice-President
Tom] Tauke said Verizon backs net neutrality but wants it obtained through industry ef-
forts."); Jonathan Make & Anne Veigle, NCTA, Verizon Back Similar Video Franchise Re-
form Provisions, COMM. DAILY, Jan. 31, 2006, at 3 ("Net neutrality is another 2006 [Na-
tional Cable and Telecommunications Association] priority .... 'New networks are being
developed every single day".... 'This is not the time to pass a law that chills that kind of
innovation."'); Free Press Slammed Verizon, AT&T and Comcast, COMM. DAILY (Jan. 25,
2006), at 14-15 ("'After destroying TV and radio, mega-media corporations are scheming to
control what content you can view and which services you can use online,' Free Press said..
. The group offered to write CEOs of supporters' broadband providers and send copies to
their members of congress, asking them to write net neutrality into law.").
With regard to the antitrust aspects of the net neutrality, recently introduced legislation
weeks to explicitly preclude unfair methods of competition and deceptive practices. S. 2119,
109th Cong. § 102 (2005).
206 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (2000) (sharing of jurisdiction for wireline communications).
207 WorldCom-MCI Merger, supra note 170, 149.
208 Id. 1.
209 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (2000).
210 WorldCom-MCl Merger, supra note 170, 10.
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with additional provisions in an effort to cure any aspect of the merger that is
against the public interest."' So, while it is clear from the language of the 1996
Act that nothing shall curtail the antitrust law's application to the telecommu-
nications industry,2 2 the FCC has also made it clear through its review of the
WorldCom-MCI merger that it will freely exercise its concurrent antitrust ju-
risdiction to protect consumers. '
C. Criticism That BrandX and Its Progeny Will Lead to Content Restrictions
Is Misplaced
The fear of stifled competition raises two major concerns regarding the
FCC's decisions to deregulate the broadband Internet market."4 Critics opine
that without the Title II common-carrier restrictions on the broadband market,
cable and DSL companies will be able to (1) raise prices in exercise of monop-
oly power; and (2) further exercise that power to restrict the current open na-
ture of the Internet that allows for liberal access to legal content.2 5 However,
what critics fail to realize is that even without intrusive common-carrier re-
quirements, the broadband Internet market is still competitive today. This
competition, along with the other safeguards previously mentioned, will pre-
vent these circumstances from becoming a reality." 6
The competition that has already been discussed between DSL, cable, and
developing technologies is sufficient to preserve Internet content neutrality.
'1 7
Given the high state of competition, it would simply be a bad strategy for
broadband service providers to exclude certain content from its offerings be-
cause customers would easily be able to switch providers to satisfy their con-
tent preferences." 8 The FCC has recognized that cable and DSL are likely to
make private agreements with non-facilities-based ISPs to keep their content as
benefits to their customers instead of excluding it from the Internet alto-
gether. 9 Such agreements would not only be allowed under Title II deregula-
211 Id. 10 ("Where necessary, the Commission may attach conditions to the approval of
a transfer of licenses in order to ensure that the public interest is served by the transaction.").
212 Applicability Consent Decrees and Other Law, Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. IV, § 601,
110 Stat. 143 (1996).
213 See generally WorldCom-MCI Merger, supra note 170, 10-11 (acknowledging the
concurrent jurisdiction of the DOJ and the FTC).
214 See, e.g., BROADBAND TODAY, supra note 35, at 11.
215 Id.
216 See discussion supra Parts III-IV.
217 See discussion supra Part IV.A. While this Comment contends that net neutrality is
secured, it should be noted that the debate is very much alive on Capital Hill. See discus-
sion, supra note 205.
218 See DSL Ruling, supra note 1, 88.
219 Id.
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tion, but encouraged since such private agreements are a manifestation of free
market power.2 °
Additionally, with regard to ensuring Internet neutrality, if criticism of Title
II deregulation were found to be persuasive, regulators would have to address
not just Internet service providers' potential to restrict content, but also every
other component industry involved with Internet access.2 ' This would include
companies that provide products and services such as software and browsers
that are essential to effective Internet access beyond the transmission aspects.
To go down the road of regulating every potential bottleneck in Internet ser-
vice that has a remote potential to affect content, would be a long and slippery
slope because there are so many technologies and industries that contribute to
Internet use. 223 Regulators, however, need not turn down this path. Just as is the
case with cable and DSL service providers, these other Internet components
face competition from the many substitute products that are available, and thus,
any bottleneck restricting content is not a legitimate concern.224
Along with the competition argument for ensuring content freedom, there is
also a wholesale argument to be made as well. 25 What is meant by wholesale is
that service providers that offer a variety of ISP options can do so at lower
prices rather than just offering each individually. 26 Freedom from Title II regu-
lation has created an incentive for broadband companies to include ISPs.227 By
keeping these services and content tied to their own, cable and DSL providers
can take advantage of wholesale offerings to consumers. Wholesale offerings
translates into not only better prices for consumers but also more content
choice. 228 By offering many services together, customers will have choices
within an individual broadband provider's products and find this provider more
attractive both for short-term and long-term business.2 9 To this end, Title II
deregulation is likely to keep many ISPs available, leaving only those with
220 See id. 87 ("[M]arket-based commercial arrangements will better serve the interests
of ISPs, broadband providers, and consumers.").




224 See discussion infra Part III.A.
225 See DSL Ruling, supra note 1, 50 (finding there has been increasing competition for
network access at the wholesale level).
226 See BROADBAND INTERNET ACCESS, supra note 46, at 9 (noting that with competitive
contracts customers who want access to another would no longer have to also pay for their
facility service provider's ISP, thus they can get their first choice without paying double).
227 See DSL Ruling, supra note 1, 87-88.
228 Id. 88 (recognizing that cooperative ISP arrangements can lead to more creative and
differentiated service).
229 See BROADBAND INTERNET ACCESS, supra note 46, at 9.
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little value to consumers by the wayside in a private agreement scheme."' ISPs
would only face exclusion under Title 1I deregulation if their services do not
offer value in the eyes of the consumer and consequently offer no added value
for transmission service companies who might retain them."' The effect of this
exclusionary threat will not be the restriction of valuable Internet content but
rather motivation for those under-demanded ISPs to reinvent their services in
hopes of regaining consumer value.232
Broadband providers serve consumer preferences through the creation of in-
novative private agreements that were not available under Title I1 regula-
tions.233 In the pre-Brand X world, broadband transmission facilities had to re-
main open pursuant to a fixed regulatory price, but now companies can ex-
periment with new arrangements, such as profit sharing or a pricing scheme
based on the number of people visiting a site.3 These creative agreement al-
ternatives can establish the necessary revenue incentives for investment in de-
ployment and improved the service speed-an incentive that was thwarted un-
der the strict Title II price regulations. 3 Under Title II, ISPs faced no substan-
tive competition because they were guaranteed transmission access, but now
they will be forced to provide quality services to consumers."' After Title 11
deregulation, consumers should not fear monopolistic price or content harms
because of the substantial incentive for broadband providers to continue offer-
ing varied content at a lower cost to consumers.237
230 See id.
231 See DSL Ruling, supra note 1, 88.
232 Id.
233 See id ("[A] number of carrier commenters indicate that their preferred means of
offering wireline broadband transmission service is through customized arrangements tai-
lored to the particular needs of requesting ISP customers.").
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VI. POTENTIAL BENEFIT TO CONSUMERS FROM DEREGULATION,
ALONG WITH SAFEGUARDS AGAINST MARKET FAILURE,
PRECLUDE THE NEED FOR FURTHER REGULATION OF THE
BROADBAND MARKET
A. Universal Service Fund Requirements Should Not Be Imposed on the
Broadband Market Since They Will Reduce the Advantages of Title It
Deregulation
As part of the Cable and DSL Rulings, the FCC considered the Universal
Service Fund ("USF") and what obligation cable and DSL firms should have to
continue making contributions. 38 Ultimately, however, the Commission left the
issue unresolved in these decisions and instead issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking to continue discussion of the matter. 39 Congress established the
USF under 47 U.S.C. § 254. Pursuant to subsection (d), this statute requires
telecommunications carriers to contribute money to a common account used to
promote equal distribution of telecommunications service to all parts of the
United States including rural areas.24' The FCC, however, is free to make ex-
emptions if the contributions would be minimal. The agency also has the
power to include additional providers in the requirements if the "public inter-
est" so requires.24' In the case of DSL, the FCC required wireline companies to
continue making contributions for a 270 day provisional period after the DSL
Ruling to preserve the status quo.
242
The FCC need not continue to hold broadband providers to these require-
ments because they may actually thwart deployment objectives. With 95% of
the United States having access to high-speed Internet lines, the FCC has done
an excellent job of meeting its obligation of deployment under the 1996 Act.243
The increased competition between existing and emerging broadband provid-
238 See, e.g., id. 112-13.
239 Cable Ruling, supra note 2, 114; DSL Ruling, supra note 1, 112-13; see also In
re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-
Streamlined Contributor Reporting Requirements Associated with Administration of Tele-
communications Relay Service, North American Numbering Plan, Local Number Portabil-
ity, and Universal Service Support Mechanisms; Telecommunications Services for Indi-
viduals with Hearing and Speech Disabilities, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990; Administration of the North American Numbering Plan and North American Number-
ing Plan Cost Recovery Contribution Factor and Fund Size; Number Resource Optimiza-
tion; Telephone Number Portability; Truth-in-Billing and Billing Format, Report and Order
and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 24,952, 66-100 (Dec.
12, 2002).
240 47 U.S.C. § 254(d) (2000).
241 Id. § 254(d).
242 DSL Ruling, supra note 1, 113.
241 See INDUSTRY ACCESS REPORT, supra note 120, tbl. 13.
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ers will provide ample competition that will inevitably seek to capture the re-
maining untapped portion of the market and fully complete broadband de-
ployment.2" Currently, broadband is 99% available in rural areas with less than
forty-one people per square mile; it would be a poor allocation of resources to
continue to impose regulatory restrictions for such a minimal contribution to
deployment.24 In these rural locations it may be argued that without the USF to
provide the outlay of capital for broadband facilities, these citizens may never
receive broadband service because the high costs of creating the infrastructure
make the venture unprofitable especially given the limited number of custom-
ers available.246 Such rationale fails to recognize that any failure to deploy to
these areas will be remedied as developing technologies, and wireless ones in
particular, will likely supply this demand to establishing their initial market
presence.247
Additionally, any imposition of USF taxes on broadband services to support
new technologies such as Voice over Internet Protocol ("VolP") should also be
discouraged.248 Such a use of the USF would also undermine deployment of
new technologies, just as it would with broadband access deployment. 49 The
inherent value of Title II deregulation is that it allows for rapid deployment of
new technologies by eliminating free-riding ISPs, solidifying profit margins,
and facilitating the flow of investment capital. Thus, no action should be taken
to extend USF contributions for broadband providers. 5 Imposing USF restric-
tions increases the cost of implementing new services and makes it more diffi-
cult for businesses to financially justify the expansion. Look, for example, at
the deployment possibilities of new wireless broadband technology.5 Wireless
technology is ideal for providing service in rural areas because its inherent na-
ture does not require the same outlay of capital investment that traditional ca-
244 See discussion supra Part 1II.
245 See INDUSTRY ACCESS REPORT, supra note 120, tbl.1 3.
246 See id.
247 See DSL Ruling, supra note 1, 89.
248 See Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service Seeks Comment on Proposals to
Modify the Commission's Rules Relating to High-Cost Universal Service Support, Public
Notice, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,267, 14,306 (Aug. 17, 2005) (Nelson, Comm'r., submitting app. C
"A Holistically Integrated Package") (suggesting that VoIP providers be forced to contribute
to the USF because of their relationship to decline in traditional long distance wireline traf-
fic and contributions).
249 See Anne Broache, New Taxes Could Slam Net Phone Users, CNET NEWS.COM, Aug.
23, 2005, http://news.com.com/New+taxes+could+slam+Net+phone+users/2100-7352_3-
5842237.html ("[Requiring VolP carriers to contribute to the USF] would effectively mean
new taxes on customers of Net telephone companies that don't currently pay into the USF.
Companies that already pay into the fund indirectly may have to raise their rates because
their contribution would likely have to increase.").
250 See DSL Ruling, supra note 1, 113.
251 See discussion supra Part II.B.
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ble and DSL services do.252 With a USF tax imposed to support some technolo-
gies such as VoIP, firns may face increased costs, making new technology
deployment prohibitively expensive. 53 Market forces will encourage technol-
ogy deployment as broadband firms seek to offer their customers the most ser-
vices possible, including VolP. Thus, the USF is not necessary to fulfill the
public interest in providing these new technologies and the market should be
left to implement these new services without USF restrictions in accordance
with Congress' deregulatory preference. 54 Moreover, it should be remembered
that if market forces fail, the FCC has not waived its authority to bring back
USF requirements under § 254. For now, the Commission should allow its new
policies to take effect and allow the market to close the gap on broadband de-
ployment
B. Net Neutrality Legislation Is Unnecessary Given Title I Ancillary
Jurisdiction, Antitrust Law and Competitive Safeguards
In response to the recent FCC decisions that Title I1 common-carrier regula-
tions do not apply to cable and DSL broadband providers, some have called for
Congress and the FCC to explicitly mandate line sharing independent of the
1996 Act hoping that such action would protect consumers from monopolisti-
cally high prices and censorship. 56 The issue, known as "net neutrality," re-
volves around a fear that big telecom and cable companies will no longer treat
all ISPs-from start-ups to large established ones--equally, and instead will
give favored status to the ISPs of their choosing based on the content of the
websites they support. 57 Senators Ensign and McCain introduced a bill called
the Broadband Investment and Consumer Choice Act ("Ensign and McCain
Bill") on July 27, 2005, just after the Supreme Court handed down the BrandX
decision.25 ' This is just one recent bill out of many that attempts to address net
neutrality issues.25 9 However, at this point, additional regulation of broadband
252 BROADBAND TODAY, supra note 35, at 22 ("With their unlimited coverage area, satel-
lite systems will offer broadband access to virtually any part of the United States and may
be the best method for serving remote regions.
253 See Broache, supra note 249.
254 See, e.g., DSL Ruling, supra note 1, 14,856 n.8 (quoting the preamble of the 1996
Act and the notes to 47 U.S.C. § 157 (2000)).
255 47 U.S.C. § 254.
256 See discussion supra note 11.
257 Robert J. Samuelson, When the Net Goes From Free to Fee, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 27,
2006, at 14. The concern over keeping the Internet neutral is, in part, that new start-ups will
be relegated to narrow-band providers and innovative services will be competitively handi-
capped making the Internet a zero-sum game where some Internet services will have to be
forced out before new ones can emerge. Id.
258 S. 1504, 109th Cong. (2005).
... See S. 1063, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 2113, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 2418 109th
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service is an unnecessary action that would decrease the competitive incentives
for broadband. 6 ° The Ensign and McCain Bill proposes that consumers cannot
be denied access to any Internet content unless it is illegal, allowed to be pro-
hibited by federal or state law, or cannot be supported by the technical limita-
tions of a consumer's purchased service.26" ' This limit, and similar ones in other
proposed net neutrality legislation, would negatively impact the ability of
broadband providers to create private wholesale agreements with consumer-
valued ISP service providers and undercut incentives for ISPs to improve the
quality of their service, both of which are significant benefits of Title 1I de-
regulation.262
The major motivations behind the 1996 Act were to "promote competition,
reduce regulation and encourag[e] the rapid deployment of telecommunica-
tions technologies" such as broadband Internet service, and the FCC's recent
Cable and DSL Rulings further those goals. 63 The Ensign and McCain Bill and
other net neutrality legislation would force broadband providers to offer ser-
vices even in cases where consumers do not value or demand a particular ISP's
content. 264 A better approach would be to let the market forces decide what
ISPs consumers desire just as the FCC's new policy allows. 26 Private agree-
ments can help determine which ISPs are desirable, especially since these
Cong. (2005); see also discussion supra note 205. Senator Ron Wyden has also been draft-
ing a net neutrality bill called the Internet Non-Discrimination Act of 1996. Internet Non-
Discrimination Act of 1996. http://newszdnet.com/2300-1035 22-6045311- I .html. While
the bill had not been introduced when this Comment went to print, recent drafts prohibit
Internet facility owners from charging non-network ISPs "unreasonable" rates for access to
its transmission lines and furthermore, prohibits any unequal access to unaffiliated con-
tent-either by offering it at slower speeds or higher prices. Id.
260 See S. 1504 § 7.
261 Id. § 7.
A consumer may not be denied access to any content provided over facilities used to
provide broadband communications service and a broadband service provider shall not
willfully and knowingly block access to such content by a subscriber, unless-
(A) such content is determined to be illegal;
(B) such denial is expressly authorized by Federal or State law; or
(C) such access is inconsistent with the terms of the service plan of such customer
including applicable bandwidth capacity or quality of service constraints.
Id.
262 DSL Ruling, supra note 1, 89; see also NCTA, Verizon Back Similar Video Fran-
chise Reform Provisions, COMM. DAILY, Jan. 31, 2006, at 3 ("Net neutrality is another 2006
[National Cable and Telecommunications Association] priority . . . . 'New networks are
being developed every single day".... 'This is not the time to pass a law that chills that
kind of innovation."').
263 DSL Ruling, supra note 1, 14,856 n.8 (quoting the preamble of the 1996 Act and the
notes to 47 U.S.C. § 157 (2000)).
264 See S. 1504 § 7, 109th Cong. (2005).
265 See Cable Ruling, supra note 2, 48; DSL Ruling, supra note 1, 88-95.
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agreements can be performance-based.266 As discussed, even in the event of an
Internet market failure, monopoly content and price fears will still not be real-
ized because the Commission can take remedial measures under Title I ancil-
lary jurisdiction or the antitrust laws. 16' Accordingly, net neutrality legislation
is presently unnecessary and potentially harmful.
VII. CONCLUSION
Brand X and the related FCC decisions have significantly modified the
broadband landscape and this change is for the best.268 Consumers can and will
benefit from the recent changes toward a free and competitive broadband mar-
ket.169 While common-carrier requirements have now been cast aside for cable
and DSL broadband providers, numerous regulations and statutes still remain
in place that will prevent monopoly control of broadband service. 7 Moreover,
consumers stand to reap long-run benefits from this deregulation because com-
mon-carrier deregulation will lead to more broadband service options and con-
tinued price decreases as developing technologies further compete with DSL
and cable broadband providers. 7' While there will certainly be pressure on
Congress to counteract the FCC's deregulation, the FCC's push toward a free
broadband market is in the public interest because of the variety of benefits it
brings to consumers. 273 Accordingly, fears of Internet censorship should be
discounted in light of these benefits and the protections that free market forces
and competition inherently provide. 274 The FCC has made a deregulatory
choice for the broadband market after careful consideration of the public inter-
ests, and having chosen wisely, lawmakers should give great deference to the
agency's expertise, just as the Supreme Court did in its BrandX decision, be-
fore hastily imposing new laws that could undo the long-term benefits secured
by the FCC for consumers.275 Internet service has been, and will continue to be,
a rapidly changing product, and the FCC's Title II deregulation has ensured
266 See DSL Ruling, supra note 1, 88-89.
267 See discussion supra Part IV.
268 See discussion supra Part III.D.
269 See discussion supra Part IV.
270 See discussion supra Part IV.
271 DSL Ruling, supra note 1, 74-76 (noting that many wireline broadband service
providers have demonstrated their commitment to keeping their transmission lines available
to unaffiliated ISPs).
272 See, e.g., S. 1504 109th Cong. (2005).
273 See discussion supra Parts Ill-IV.
274 See generally sources cited supra note 11.
275 Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2712
(2005) (showing deference to the FCC by admitting they are experts and thus "in a far better
position to address these" complex issues).
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that consumers will be able to experience the benefits of these changes in an
efficient long-term manner without the burden of reactionary regulatory lag.
